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VOLUME 1974 NUMBER 1
THE MIRROR IMAGE CONFLICTS CASE
CHARLES R. HAWORTH*
Since the 1969 decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in Kennedy
v. Dixon,' adopting for Missouri the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws approach to tort choice-of-law cases, only two Missouri cases
have raised what can be characterized as difficult tort choice-of-law
problems. 2  One of these cases, Griggs v. Riley,3 presented the Mis-
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University. B.A., 1965, J.D., 1967,
University of Texas-Austin.
1. 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969) (en bane).
2. Indeed, Missouri state courts have had only eight opportunities to cite Ken-
nedy. Of these, only Griggs v. Riley, 489 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. App. 1972), and State
er rel. Broglin v. Nangle, No. 34812 (Mo. App., July 10, 1973), presented significant
conflicts problems. The main issue in Broglin was whether the then-existing Missouri
limitation on wrongful death damages, Law of Aug. 2, 1967, 11967] Mo. Laws 664 (re-
pealed 1973), or the Texas no-limit statute, TEx. Rnv. Civ. STAT. art. 4677 (1952),
was to apply to a death that occurred in Texas. The court identified the relevant con-
tacts as the place of conduct and injury (Texas), the residence of plaintiff and plain-
tiff's decedent (Missouri), the place of defendant's incorporation (Missouri), and the
defendant's principal place of business (Texas). In evaluating these contacts, the court
concluded that Texas had the most significant relationship. This decision was affirmed
by a unanimous Missouri Supreme Court. State ex rel. Broglin v. Nangle, No. 58452
(Mo., June 24, 1974). I agree that Texas law was properly applied, but on the basis
of Missouri's anachronistic limitation that had been repealed prior to the decision in
Broglin. In terms of "state interests," neither state had a strong interest in having
its law applied. Texas had no interest in providing compensation to beneficiaries in
Missouri, see Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d
64 (1972), nor in regulating the defendant's conduct, since "Ellimitations of damages
for wrongful death ...have little or nothing to do with conduct.' Reich v. Purcell,
67 Cal. 2d 551, 556, 432 P.2d 727, 730-31, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 34-35 (1967). Mis-
souri's interest was in protecting the defendant from excessive liability, but in reality
Washington University Open Scholarship
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souri Court of A15peals for the St. Louis District with a factual situation
that, when considered by courts of other jurisdictions, has evoked
widespread commentary and produced divergent results. The situa-
tion arises when a guest and host from an immunity jurisdiction are
involved in an accident in a no-immunity jurisdiction. At first glance,
the case appears to present merely the "mirror image"4 of the now-
classic "false conflict" case, in which a guest and host from a no-im-
munity jurisdiction are involved in an accident in an immunity jurisdic-
tion. This Article will examine in detail the competing policies at
work in the "mirror image" case, using Griggs as the basic fact pattern
and analyzing the method of resolution proposed by the Restatement
(Second).
I. A BRIEF HISTORY
Conflicts law during the past ten years has been in a state of revo-
lution. The conflicts literature written and cases decided since the
1963 landmark decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Babcock
v. Jackson5 that the substantive law of the place of the wrong (lex
loci delicti) is not invariably to be applied in tort cases are extensive.0
Babcock presented the New York court with the simplest of conflicts
issues. The defendant-host and plaintiff-guest, both residents of New
York, were involved in a one-car accident in Ontario during a weekend
trip that began and was to end in New York. Ontario at that time
had a statute that prohibited recovery by a guest against his host.7
New York had no guest statute. Finding that Ontario had no interest
in having its statute applied but that New York had a substantial inter-
est in having its resident guest recover from her New York host,8 the
no Missouri defendant was in the suit since most of the defendant's activities were
in Texas. Thus pure interest analysis fails to solve the case. See generally Sym-
posium, Neumeier v. Kuehner: A Conflicts Conflict, 1 HoFsTRA L. REv. 93 (1973)
(comments by five authors).
3. 489 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. App. 1972).
4. See Trautman, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson: A Comment, 67 CoLum. L.
REv. 465, 466 (1967).
5. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
6. See, e.g., cases cited notes 13-15 infra; Comments on Babcock V. Jackson, A
Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLUM. L. Rv. 1212 (1963). Prior to
Babcock, American courts almost invariably applied the law of the place of the wrong
to substantive tort issues. This traditional rule of lex loci delicti is set out in RasrAm.
mENT OF CoNnlicr oF LAws §§ 377-83 (1934).
7. ONT. RFv. STAT. c. 172, § 105(2) (1960).
8. 12 N.Y.2d at 482-83, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750-51.
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court held that New York law was to be applied 'to the guest-host
issue and that the Ontario statute was not assertable as a defense 9
Since that decision, New York has had a tumultuous conflicts expe-
rience, shifting from a contact-counting approach with some vestiges
of territorialism ° to a pure interest analysis," and now apparently to
a middle ground. 12
Since 1963 about twenty other jurisdictions have abandoned the rule
of lex loci delicti in conflicts analysis and have, in most cases, adopted
the analyses proposed by the Restatement (Second)13 or by Professor
9. Id. at 485, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
10. In Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965),
the court held that the law of Colorado, not New York, governed the guest-host issue
even though both parties were from New York, since they had "come to rest" in Colo-
rado for the summer, the relationship was formed in Colorado, and the situs of the
accident (Colorado) was not fortuitous. In Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221
N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966), the court applied New York law and unconvinc-
ingly distinguished Dym on the grounds that in Macey a New York guest injured in
Ontario in a car driven by a New Yorker was only temporarily in Ontario and that
the relationship between the parties, two sisters, was formed in New York.
11. In Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519
(1969), the court concluded that New York law governed a one-car collision in Mich-
igan in which two New York girls, the driver and a guest, were killed, even though
the girls were students at Michigan State University and had met there. Tooker seem-
ingly marked the end of the precedential effect of Dym.
12. The latest major case from New York, Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121,
286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972), answered an intriguing issue left open in
Tooker. In the car in Tooker was another passenger, identified as a Michigan resident.
A favorite professor's ploy has been to ask, after a discussion of Tooker, what would
be the result in a suit by the Michigan passenger against the New York driver. In
Neumeier an Ontario guest was killed in Ontario while riding with a New York host.
In a suit in New York to recover wrongful death damages, the Ontario guest statute
was held to be a good defense. The Neumeler court found unnecessary to the Tooker
decision Judge Keating's sweeping statement that the New York legislature, by not en-
acting a guest statute and requiring comprehensive liability insurance, "has evinced
commendable concern not only for residents of this State, but residents of other States
who may be injured as a result of the activities of New York residents." 24 N.Y.2d
at 577, 249 N.E.2d at 399, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 526. Instead, the court found no reason
to set aside Ontario's policy of protecting the host against his guest See generally
Symposium, supra note 2.
13. See Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968); First Nat'l
Bank v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1973); Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 IMI. 2d 42, 262
N.E.2d 593 (1970); Fuerste v. Bemis, - Iowa -, 156 N.W.2d 831 (1968); Beaulieu
v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Me. 1970); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968);
Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969); Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750
(N.D. 1972); Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc., 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 267 N.E.2d
405, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971); DeFoor v. Lematta, 249 Ore. 116, 437 P.2d
107 (1968); Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).Washington University Open Scholarship
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Leflar, 14 or variations of Professor Currie's analysis.15 Central to each
of these methods is identification of the interests of those states that
have some factual connection to the incidents of litigation.' These
interests are not easily identified, as the New York courts have discov-
ered,17 and the problems encountered when two or more states have
interests that would be substantially advanced by application of their
law, or impaired by application of the law of another jurisdiction, have
led other courts in the years since Babcock to reject proposals to re-
solve choice-of-law problems by any method other than lex loci de-
licti. .' s
I1. "SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS" COMES TO MISSOURI
In Kennedy v. Dixon'0 the Missouri Supreme Court was presented
14. See Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Clark v.
Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Brown v. Church of Holy Name of Jesus,
105 R.I. 322, 252 A.2d 176 (1969); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d
579 (1968).
15. See Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Reich v. Purcell, 67
Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Witherspoon v. Salm, 142 Ind.
App. 655, 237 N.E.2d 116 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 251 Ind. 577, 243 N.E.2d
876 (1969); Jagers v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973); Pfau v. Trent
Alum. Co., 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970); Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121,
286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
It should be emphasized that the decisions cited here and in notes 13 & 14 supra are
not watertight compartments and that courts tend on occasion to lump the different
analyses together. See Leflar, The Torts Provisions of the Restatement (Second), 72
COLuM. L. REv. 267, 270 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Leflar, Torts Provisions].
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcr OF LAWS §§ 6(2)(b), (c) (1971)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; B. Cuins, Notes on Methods and Ob-
jectives in the Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWs 177,
183-84 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Cu~mu]; R. LEFLAR, AMERICA CONFLICTS LAW
251-54 (1968) [hereinafter cited as LEFLAR].
17. See notes 5-12 supra and accompanying text.
18. McGinty v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966);
Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Friday v. Smoot, 54 Del.
488, 211 A.2d 594 (1965); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla.
1967); McDaniel v. Sian, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965); Cook v. Pryor, 251
Md. 41, 246 A.2d 271 (1968); Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d
137 (1969); Cherokee Labs., Inc. v. Rogers, 398 P.2d 520 (Okla. 1965); Oshiek V.
Oshiek, 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964); Heidemann v. Rohl, 86 S.D. 250, 194
N.W.2d 164 (1972); Winters v. Maxey, 481 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. 1972); Marmon v.
Mustang Aviation Co., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968).
Mississippi seemed to backpeddle to a lex fori approach in McNeal v. Administrator
of Estate of McNeal, 254 So. 2d 521 (Miss. 1971), after first following the significant
contacts approach of the Restatement (Second). See note 13 supra. See also Arnett
v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968) (lex fori).
19. 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969) (en banc).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss1/6
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with facts essentially the same as those of Babcock. In Kennedy
plaintiff-guest Mrs. Kennedy took an automobile trip to New York
with her neighbors, the Toweys. All were residents of Missouri. The
trip to New York was uneventful but on the return, while Mrs. Towey
was driving, the Towey car was involved in a collision in Indiana.
Mrs. Towey was killed and Mrs. Kennedy was injured. Mrs. Kennedy
brought suit in Missouri against the administrator of Mrs. Towey's es-
tate, in part on the theory that the Indiana guest statute20 was inappli-
cable and that Missouri law, which does not recognize any special lim-
its on liability arising out of the guest-host relationship, applied.
The Kennedy court recognized that Missouri for many years had
applied the lex loci delicti rule in tort conflicts cases.21 The court
noted that although the rule had come under increasing criticism be-
cause of its sometimes harsh and inflexible applications,2 2 it had the
advantages of certainty and ease of application. 23  But faced with the
choice of retaining or rejecting lex loci delicti, the court abandoned
the rule in favor of the rule now embodied in section 145 of the Re-
statement (Second):
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue
in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect
to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and
the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of §
6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties
is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative impor-
tance with respect to the particular issue.
Not specifically referred to by the court (except within its quotation
of section 145) is section 6 of the Restatement (Second), which con-
tains the generally applicable choice-of-law principles that are the
20. IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1021 (1965).
21. 439 S.W.2d at 180. See Comment, Changes in Tort Conflict of Laws in Mis-
souri, 37 Mo. L. REv. 268, 273 (1972).
22. See cases cited notes 13-15 supra.
23. 439 S.W.2d at 180-81.
Vol. 1974: 1]
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heart of the analysis under the Restatement (Second):
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statu-
tory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice
of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of -those states in the determination of the particular
issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.
Although it did not specifically examine section 6, the Kennedy court
correctly observed that it is not the quantity but the quality of contacts
that is determinative under section 145 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond).2 4 Thus, even though the relevant conduct, accident, and injury
occurred in Indiana, those contacts were important only in determining
whether Mrs. Towey observed what are usually referred to as "rules
of the road," and did not have a significant bearing on the legal effect
to be given to the guest-host relationship. 5 On the other hand, Mis-
souri was both the domicile of the parties and the place where the
relationship of the parties was "centered." These latter contacts
were of critical importance to the court, for Missouri "has a decided
interest in having Missouri citizens who ride as passengers protected
from negligent injury by Missouri hosts."2 6 This analysis led the court
to conclude that when a Missouri host is sued by a Missouri guest
for injuries received outside Missouri on a trip that originated in Mis-
souri, the guest-host issue is to be determined by Missouri law rather
than the law of the place of injury."'
24. Id. at 184.
25. Id. at 185.
26. Id.
27. Id. A further caveat is appropriate regarding the decision of the Kennedy
court. Two justices concurred in the opinion, two dissented, one did not participate,
and one concurred solely on the ground that on the particular facts presented he would
find that Indiana's guest statute violated Missouri's public policy. Thus only three of
the seven justices actually voted to adopt the Restatement (Second) approach. The
[Vol. 1974:1
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Kennedy is subject to an interpretation that the court analyzed the
contacts not by the method posited by the Restatement (Second) but
by pure interest analysis.28 The court's implicit reference to section
6,219 however, supports the conclusion that the method adopted was
indeed that of the Restatement (Second). Of particular importance
in reaching this conclusion are sections 6(2)(b) and (c), which re-
quire a court to determine the relevant policies of the forum and
of other interested states. Although this policy determination is not
conclusive, it is of utmost importance in a tort case.3" Since this basic
analysis was used by the Kennedy court, it is proper to conclude that
Missouri tort cases are to be decided using the method proposed by
the Restatement (Second). Moreover, the court's conclusion takes a
twist that, although stated in a misleading way, is in accord with
the Restatement (Second) method. The court speculated that situa-
tions might arise in which "it will be difficult to establish clearly that
a particular state has the most significant relationship as to a particular
issue or issues. If and when such situations arise, then the trial court
should continue, as in the past, to apply the substantive law of the
place of the tort. '31 Despite Kennedy's admonition that a court should
not abdicate its obligation to determine which state has the most sig-
nificant relationship,32 this language is susceptible to the interpretation
that in a difficult case a court is justified in throwing up its hands and
simply applying the rule of lex loci delicti. A better interpretation
is that Missouri courts are merely to follow the specific rules of the
Restatement (Second) applicable to guest-host cases; sections 146 and
159 of the Restatement (Second), which state the rules to be followed
in cases involving personal injuries and the duty owed the injured
party, both state that the applicable law will usually be the law of the
jurisdiction where the injury occurred, unless some other jurisdiction
has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.33
unanimous decision in State ex rel. Broglin v. Nangle, No. 58452 (Mo., June 24, 1974),
would seem to put this caveat to rest. See note 2 supra.
28. See Comment, supra note 21, at 280.
29. 439 S.W.2d at 181. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
30. See Part TV izfra.
31. 439 S.W.2d at 185.
32. Id.
33. These more specific rules in the sections following § 145 of the Restatement
(Second) are said to create a "weak presumption" in favor of the place of the wrong.
Reee, The Kentucky Approach to Choice of Law: A Critique, 61 Ky. L.J 368, 373
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Reese, Kentucky Approach].
Vol. 1974: 1]
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Ill. GRIGGS V. RILEY: MISSOURI APPLIES THE RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
As a state whose two largest cities border on other states, 34 Mis-
souri was destined to be presented with difficult choice-of-law issues.
The first major decision after Kennedy that attempted to apply the
Restatement (Second) approach was that of the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals in Griggs v. Riley, 5 the facts of which raise many of the major
issues discussed by courts and commentators in current conflicts litera-
ture. Although the Griggs court did a commendable job of analyz-
ing the issues, its opinion and decision are subject to serious question.
The facts in Griggs that the court found important may be briefly cap-
sulized. As the court noted, the facts appear to be just the opposite
of those of Kennedy. Plaintiff-guest Griggs was injured while riding
as a passenger in an automobile operated by defendant-host Riley.
Riley's car was struck in St. Louis, Missouri, by a car driven by Mar-
tin, a Missouri resident joined as a co-defendant. At the time of
the accident both Griggs and Riley were residents of Illinois, and Illi-
nois law barred recovery by a guest for the ordinary negligence of
his host.36 Missouri has never had a guest statute.
The court could have applied Missouri law on the ground that noth-
ing in Griggs was different from Kennedy except that suit was brought
in the state of the accident instead of the state of the common domicile
of the guest and host. Instead, the court found that Griggs presented
a "true" conflict-one in which both Illinois and Missouri were inter-
ested in the outcome-rather than a "false" conflict as in Kennedy,
in which only one state (Missouri) was concerned with the determina-
tion of the Missouri defendant's liability or the Missouri plaintiff's re-
covery.17 To reach this conclusion, the court found that Missouri's
34. On the east, St. Louis borders on Illinois; on the west, Kansas City borders
on Kansas. To the southwest, Springfield is only about fifty miles from Arkansas.
35. 489 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. App. 1972).
36. Law of July 9, 1935, § 42-1, [1935] Ill. Laws 1221 (repealed 1971).
37. 489 S.W.2d at 471-72. Professor Reese distinguishes a "false" from a "true"
conflict as follows:
If the policy underlying only one of these rules would be furthered by the
rule's application, the state having this rule is obviously the state of greatest
concern and this is the rule that should be applied. If, on the other hand,
the policies underlying the rules of two or more states would each be fur-
thered by their rule's application, the court will be faced with the unenviable
task of determining which of the states involved has the greatest concern in
the application of its rule.
Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CoRNELL L. Rtv. 315, 316 (1972)
(Vol. 1974:1
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policy, represented by its absence of a guest statute, is "to compensate
victims of negligent driving regardless of any host-guest relation-
ship."' s  Implicitly, the court determined that this policy applies even
to an Illinois guest-host pairing. Balanced against this Missouri inter-
est was the Illinois policy at the time of the accident "to protect gratui-
tous hosts from suit by ungrateful guests."3 9  The court indicated that
had it felt free to determine the issue on this basis alone, it would
have held that the Illinois interest was not strong enough to outweigh
the Missouri interest.40 Bound by Kennedy, however, the court em-
barked on the relatively uncharted seas of the Restatement (Sec-
ond).4 '
The court noted initially that sections 145 and 6 of the Restatement
(Second) provide the guiding principles for determination of the
choice of law.42  Looking first to section 145, the court found that
the place of the accident (and inferentially the place of conduct) was
immaterial as merely fortuitous, leaving the residence of the parties
and the place where the relationship was centered, sections 145(2)(c)
and (d), as the critical contacts.4 3  Evaluating those contacts in light
of sections 6(2) (a) through (g), the court decided that only sub-
sections (b) and (c), which focus on the relevant policies of the
forum and of other interested jurisdictions, were important in this fac-
tual situation. 44  Of the other subsections, (a), the needs of the inter-
state system, (d), protection of justified expectations, (e), certainty,
predictability, and uniformity of result, and (f), the basic policies of
the field, were found unimportant in negligence actions; subsections
(g), ease in the determination of the law applied, and (f) were said
[hereinafter cited as Reese, Choice of Law]. Cf. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 203 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY].
38. 489 S.W.2d at 472.
39. Id. The cases cited, Summers v. Summers, 40 Ill. 2d 338, 239 N.E.2d 795
(1968), and Davidson v. Pugh, 1 Il. App. 3d 670, 274 N.E.2d 205 (1971), clearly
support this conclusion. For example, in Davidson the court said: "The rationale of
the Act is that there should be a difference between the liability of the person who,
out of the generosity of his heart, renders gratuitously some service to his fellow trav-
eler as opposed to one who renders such services for hire." Id. at 675-76, 274 N.E.2d
at 208.
40. 489 S.W.2d at 472.
41. See generally Leflar, Torts Provisions; Peterson, Developments in American
Conflict of Laws: Torts, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 289, 316-20.
42. 489 S.W.2d at 472-73.
43. Id. at 473.
44. Id.
Vol. 1974: 1]
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always to be subservient to the achievement of "desirable" results.48
In determining whether the policies of Missouri or Illinois were to
prevail, the Griggs court uncovered two additional considerations that
tipped the balance. First, the court reasoned that since the accident
was a two-car collision that involved a Missouri co-defendant (Martin)
in the second automobile, Missouri had an interest in protecting his
rights under its contribution statute" against Riley, the Illinois driver.
Application of the Illinois guest statute would "obviate that right.""
Having bolstered Missouri's interests, the court turned to Illinois' inter-
est in protecting hosts from the ingratitude of their guests. Rather
than giving that interest full extraterritorial force, the court found that
Illinois courts had historically applied the rule of lex loci delicti in
guest-host cases even when Illinois residents were concerned, and
maintained that Illinois would continue to follow that rule even though
it has applied the Restatement (Second) in other situations. Thus
an Illinois court would have applied Missouri law if Griggs had been
brought in Illinois. On that reasoning, the court concluded that it was
"not constrained to afford Illinois hosts greater protection than Illinois
courts would afford them, particularly when to do so conflicts with the
policy of this state."4  Thus, despite its initial evaluation, the court
found that Griggs in effect presented a "false" conflict, with Missouri
having the only significant interest in the outcome, and held that the
trial court had not erred in applying Missouri law.40
IV. ABDICATION, USURPATION, OR MODERN ADJUDICATION?
The result in Griggs is perhaps more startling today than it would
have been fifteen years ago when lex loci delicti was still the prevail-
ing method of conflicts analysis. But to persons indoctrinated with
"significant contacts" and other modem approaches to choice of law,
the result must cause some concern. After all, the most significant
contacts in Griggs were apparently with Illinois, not Missouri, since
both the guest and host were domiciled in Illinois, the relationship
45. Id.
46. Mo. RFV. STAT. § 537.060 (1969).
47. 489 S.W.2d at 473.
48. Id. at 474.
49. Alternatively, the Griggs court considered its result to be in accord with Ken-
nedy's "escape valve," which allows the law of the place of the wrong to apply when
it is difficult to determine the state of most significant relationship. See text accom-
panying notes 31-33 supra.
[Vol. 1974: 1
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was formed there, the car was presumably garaged and insured there,
and all other contacts were in Illinois except the place of the injury
and the forum. Although under section 146 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) the place of injury is usually determinative,5" and a comment
to that section further suggests that when the places of conduct and
injury coincide the law of that state will usually be applied,r1 section
146 must be considered in connection with section 156, which con-
cerns the determination of the applicable law regarding the tortious
nature of the actor's conduct.52 A comment to section 156 suggests
that in the situation presented in Griggs, the "local law of . . . the
state where the parties are domiciled [Illinois], may be applied to
determine whether [Riley] is entirely immune from tort liability to
[Griggs] because of the guest-passenger relationship or is liable to
[Griggs] only for gross negligence."53  A comparison may be made
to intrafamily immunity problems, which are usually determined by
the local law of the common domicile of the parties.54 Thus the Re-
statement (Second) points both ways on the resolution of the Griggs
problem, the general rules pointing toward Missouri but the comments
pointing toward Illinois, and the court was thrown back, as it consid-
ered itself to be, on the choice-of-law principles of section 6.11
A. Analysis of Section 6
The principles of section 6 are by no means an exhaustive list of
the considerations that might be taken into account in deciding a con-
50. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) § 146 provides:
In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the in-
jury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with
respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant rela-
tionship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the par-
ties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
51. Id., comment d.
52. Id. § 156 provides:
(1) The law selected by application of the rule of § 145 determines
whether the actor's conduct was tortious.
(2) The applicable law will usually be the local law of the state where
the injury occurred.
53. Id., comment f.
54. See Reese, Kentucky Approach 374 (on interspousal immunity the Restatement
(Second) is "quite precise, since it calls for the usual application of the local law of
the state of the parties' domicile on the ground that this state will almost invariably
be the state of greatest concern").
55. See text following note 23 supra.
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flicts case.56 Neither is the list an original compilation, having had
its genesis in Cheatham and Reese's 1952 article which set out nine
considerations.57 With some revision, and deletion of the policy that
a court should apply local law in the absence of a good reason for
not doing so and of the policy of justice in the individual case, the
Restatement (Second) list was formed.5s Leflar's now famous list of
five considerations is, as he freely admits, simply a further reduction
of Cheatham and Reese's nine.59 In light of this development, Cheat-
ham and Reese's original explanation of their considerations should
carry weight in interpreting section 6.
The Missouri Court of Appeals' first consideration of sections 145
and 6 was a disaster. The court initially limited the important contacts
of section 145 to subsections (c) and (d), the domicile of the parties
and the place where the relationship was centered.6 If this limitation
were proper, the court should simply have stopped and rendered judg-
ment for the defendant, since both contacts were with Illinois and,
regardless of how those contacts were evaluated, the result would have
had to favor the application of Illinois law. The court's further obser-
vation that the place of the accident and conduct was fortuitous 1
seems relevant, but also points in favor of -the defendant. The impor-
tance of these Missouri contacts, which the court eventually found
overwhelming, was initially ignored but was later recognized when the
court, without saying so, evaluated the contacts in light of section 6
and the policies of Missouri to which the court thought the contacts
gave rise.
56. See, e.g., Yntema, The Objectives of Private International Law, 35 CAN. B.
REv. 721, 734-35 (1957) (lists seventeen considerations).
57. Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. Rav. 959
(1952).
58. The reader should remember that Willis L.M. Reese was also the reporter
for the Restatement (Second). For further analysis of the initial drafts of the
Restatement (Second), see Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement (Second), 28
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 679 (1963).
59. LEFLAR 244. His considerations are:
(a) predictability of result
(b) maintenance of interstate and international order
(c) simplification of the judicial task
(d) advancement of the forum's governmental interests
(e) application of the better rule of law
Id. at 245.
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In evaluating the contacts, the Griggs court dismissed some of the
section 6 principles as being of little value in the context of the case. 62
To a large extent I agree. First, section 6(2)(d) admonishes a court
to protect "justified expectations." In a contract or will case this con-
sideration might assume insurmountable importance, but, as the com-
ments to the Restatement (Second) suggest, negligence cases by defi-
nition involve acts committed without consideration of the legal conse-
quences of the acts; thus there are "no justified expectations to protect,
and this factor can play no part in the decision of a [tort] choice-of-
law question.""3  To a lesser extent, the same general analysis ap-
plies to section 6(2)(f), which encourages certainty, predictability,
and uniformity of result. As the comments note, these considerations
are more important in areas of planned activity, such as contracts, land
transactions, and wills, but are of some importance in "all areas of
the law." ' These values can certainly be carried too far, as some
of the more extreme examples of the application of lex loci delicti
demonstrate,65 but since section 6(2)(f) also carries with it an ad-
monition to discourage forum shopping, the Griggs court should have
been more concerned than it was about insulating the result from the
choice of the forum.66 Admittedly, Missouri was a logical place for
the litigation, but, except for the claim against Martin, Illinois would
have been the likely choice.
Section 6(2)(g), which advocates "ease in the determination and
application of the law to be applied," is a third pervasive consideration
too readily dismissed by the Griggs court. If, as advocated by Lef-
lar,67 this consideration may be broadened to include the tempering
of the substance-procedure problem from the hodge-podge of rules,
subrules, and exceptions that now exists (for example, in the statute
of limitations area), its general application would be even more pro-
found. But even limited to a consideration of the ease afforded by
the choice-of-law rule itself, the ability of a court to handle its choice-
of-law rule or analysis in an expeditious manner is a relevant consid-
62. Id.
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 6, comment g.
64. Id., comment i.
65. See, e.g., Alabama Great S.R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).
66. See also Maier, Coordination of Laws in a National Federal State: An Analy-
sis of the Writings of Elliott Evans Cheatham, 26 VAND. L. REv. 209, 254-55 (1973)
(suggesting that certainty and predictability are also important in aiding practicing law-
yers to advise clients properly of their chances of success in litigation).
67. See LEFLAR 250.
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eration, even in a negligence action. Griggs affords an example of
the problem of an absence of definitive guidelines for the resolution
of concrete cases that may eventually be avoided by additional em-
phasis on this consideration."8 After Griggs, Missouri trial courts in
cases with the same basic facts as Griggs will have little guidance, since
the slightest change in those facts-for example, the absence of a
second defendant in a one-car accident-may completely change the
result.
Section 6(2)(a), maintenance of interstate and international rela-
tions, was rejected by the Griggs court as having "little. impact."00
Generally, this position is correct, but in the context of Griggs the court
might have considered more fully the possibility that Illinois would be
so offended by what it might consider an unjustified intrusion by Mis-
souri into essentially local Illinois problems as to invite "later retalia-
tion in kind. '70  The respective interests of Illinois and Missouri will
be analyzed later,7' but it is arguable that Missouri's interest is so mini-
mal as to be completely overriden by that of Illinois. If this argument
is accepted, the Griggs result constitutes an "officious interference" '72
with Illinois affairs, and the favor may be returned at the first oppor-
tunity.
Lastly, the Griggs court appears to have rejected as unhelpful sec-
tion 6(2)(e), which requires the court to examine "the basic policies
underlying the particular field of law." The comment to this section
casts a different light on the consideration than that derivable from
studying Cheatham and Reese's earlier work. The Restatement (Sec-
ond) comment emphasizes exclusively the basic policies of the particu-
lar field of law,73 rather than "the fundamental policy underlying the
broad local law field involved. '7 4  The comment suggests that this
consideration is helpful in resolving conflicts between minor variations
of different states' laws: for example, slight differences in the rate
of interest that constitutes usury, although the basic policy of prevent-
ing usury is the same in both states.75 The Restatement (Second)
68. See generally Reese, Choice of Law.
69. 489 S.W.2d at 473.
70. LEaLAR 249.
71. See text accompanying notes 81-143 infra.
72. Cf. WImmAtB, ComENTARY 246.
73. RESEATmvENT (SEcOxD) § 6, comment h.
74. Cheatham & Reese, supra note 57, at 978.
75. RFSTATEMENT (SEcOND) § 6, comment h.
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test, if used, is obviously of no help in situations in which policy differ-
ences are as basic and evenly divided among the states as the presence
or absence of guest statutes in Griggs.7 6  On the other hand, the Cheat-
ham-Reese proposal of furthering general policy in a broad area of
law might have helped to tip the balance toward the application of
Missouri law, since the trend in tort cases generally is toward liabil-
ity.17 But as the Restatement (Second) is presently formulated, the
Griggs court properly rejected section 6 (2) (e) as unhelpful.
In the court's view, the case ultimately came down to a conflict be-
tween section 6(2)(b), the relevant policies of the forum, and section
6(2)(c), the relevant policies of Illinois. Missouri had an interest in
compensating victims of negligent driving, regardless of the guest-host
relationship, and in protecting Missourian Martin, the driver of the
other car, by allowing him the opportunity for contribution from
Riley.78 The Illinois interest was to protect gratuitous hosts from suits
76. In a recent article, Professor Weintraub lists twenty-six states that retain a
guest statute. Weintraub, Finding a Substitute for the Place-of-Wrong Rule: The Ken-
tucky Experience, 61 Ky. LJ. 419, 425 n.19 (1973). Illinois has since amended its
statute to prevent recovery only by hitchhikers. Law of Sept. 8, 1971, § 1, £19711 Ill.
Laws 2716, amending ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95%/z, § 10-201 (Smith-Hurd 1971). A
Massachusetts statute has eliminated a judge-created rule, see Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228
Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917), requiring a showing of more than ordinary negligence
by a host for recovery. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85L (Supp. 1973).
Georgia still retains its court-made rule requiring the guest to show more than ordinary
negligence. See Hennon v. Hardin, 78 Ga. App. 81, 50 S.E.2d 236 (1948). The Cal-
ifornia guest statute was recently held unconstitutional, Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855,
506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973), as was that of Kansas, Henry v. Bauder,
- Kan. -, 518 P.2d 362 (1974).
77. See Reese, Kentucky Approach 372: "[O]ne of the most basic purposes of tort
law is to provide compensation to a plaintiff for his injuries. And surely at least one
of a judge's objectives in a choice of law case should be to further the basic policies
underlying the particular field of law that is involved." Professor Reese recently sug-
gested that "the time may have come when it is recognized that [compensation of the
victim] is the basic policy underlying at least the area of unintentional torts." Reese,
Choice of Law 333. See also WEmTm1 TUB, COMmNTARY 204 (advocating an examina-
tion of the trend toward liability in tort as a means of resolving "true" conflict cases).
A word of warning is appropriate here. This consideration is not the same as Lef-
lar's "better rule" approach, see LELAR 254-59, since it does not necessarily involve a
subjective evaluation of the wisdom of the opposing rules. It is more accurately an ob-
jective standard, which does not raise questions of "comparative jurisprudence." See D.
CAVERS, THE CHoicE OF LAW PROCESs 86 (1965) [hereinafter cited as CAVERS]; Seidel-
son, Interest Analysis: For Those Who Like It and Those Who Don't, 11 DUQUESNE
L. R v. 283, 307 (1973); cf. WEncmlu, COMmNTARY 206-07 (third consideration
in breaking a true conflict-"anachronism").
78. 489 S.W.2d at 473.
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by ungrateful guests. 79 The court then undercut the applicability of
that interest to the case, concluding that since Illinois would not apply
its guest statute extraterritorially, Missouri should not protect Illinois
residents to a greater extent than Illinois would.0
B. Identification of Interests
The Griggs court's identification and evaluation of the interests of
the two states is subject to serious question. It is submitted that the
court misconstrued the Illinois tort choice-of-law rule, erroneously used
its conception of that rule to diminish Illinois' interest in the case, over-
emphasized the Missouri interest in compensating the plaintiff, and
misapplied any possible Missouri interest in contribution for Martin.
1. Illinois Interests
The Missouri court interpreted Illinois law as retaining the rule of
lex loci delicti and used that interpretation to support a lessening of
Illinois' interest in the case. Even assuming for the moment the pro-
priety of relying on a territorially oriented choice-of-law rule to eval-
uate interests, the Griggs court, by overlooking the significant decision
in Ingersoll v. Klein,"' misconstrued Illinois choice-of-law develop-
ments. In Ingersoll the Illinois Supreme Court considered a damage
action based on Iowa law for a death that occurred in Iowa, although
the residence of the decedent and all other interested parties was Illi-
nois. The court dismissed the case, holding that Illinois law was appli-
cable. The court reasoned that the "[r]ealization of unjust and anom-
alous results which may ensue from an application of lex loci delicti
leads us to believe that a 'most significant contacts' rule best serves
the interests of the State-and the parties involved in a multi-state tort
action. The record in this case clearly establishes that Illinois has the
most significant contact with the action."'82 It is difficult to see how
any court could read Ingersoll, which states clearly that the rule of
section 146 is to be followed in tort cases,8 3 as less than a rejection
79. Id. at 472.
80. Id. at 474.
81. 46 Ill. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970).
82. Id. at 47, 262 N.E.2d at 596.
83. Id. at 46-47, 262 N.E.2d at 595. See Leflar, Conflict of Laws, in 1971/72
ANr. SuRVEY Am. L. 1, 13 (1973) ("the [Ingersoll] court's rejection of the lex loci
delicti rule was explicit").
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of lex loci delicti. The cases relied upon by the Griggs court8 4 were
all decided prior to Ingersoll except one,"5 which expressly relied
upon Ingersoll's "more significant relationship" approach as an alterna-
tive method for applying Illinois law. 80  The only possible exception
to Ingersoll's rejection of lex loci delicti must be inferred from Graham
v. General U.S. Grant Post No. 2665, V.F.W.,8 7 which held that Illi-
nois' dram shop act8 8 was not to be applied extraterritorially, not be-
cause of any continued vitality of the vested rights theory, but because
of prior consistent constructions of the act by the court not overruled
by the legislature and the harsh nature of the Illinois act.89 Whether
Justice Kluczynski, the author of both Graham and Ingersoll, and the
rest of the court would apply the reasoning of Graham to the extra-
territorial application of the Illinois guest statute in a guest-host situa-
tion may be uncertain, but the question is not as free of difficulty as
the Griggs court suggested. Indeed, most indications are that the Illi-
nois court would not so apply Graham's reasoning.
A more serious issue is raised by the Griggs court's lessening of
Illinois' interest by reliance on its determination that Illinois would not
apply its local law in a Griggs-type case; since Illinois would have had
no interest in the outcome of the case had it been brought in Illinois,
the court reasoned, Missouri will not supply an interest. This ap-
proach appears to be nothing more than an application of the admoni-
tion not to be more Roman than the Romans. Professor Weintraub
has suggested a completely different approach to the problem.90
84. Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post No. 2665, V.F.W., 43 Ill. 2d 1, 248
N.E.2d 657 (1969); Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); Aurora
Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 132 Ill. App. 2d 217, 268 N.E.2d 552 (1971); Drengberg v.
Gerke, 88 Ill. App. 2d 368, 232 N.E.2d 145 (1967).
85. Aurora Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 132 Ill. App. 2d 217, 268 N.E.2d 552 (1971).
86. The court also relied on a characterization of the issue as one of family law
to be determined by the law of the parties' domicile. Id. at 220, 268 N.E.2d at 554.
See also Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Haumschild v. Con-
tinental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
87. 43 Ill. 2d 1, 248 N.E.2d 657 (1969).
88. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
89. 43 Ill. 2d at 5, 248 N.E.2d at 660. See Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc.,
430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968) (refusing to switch to the "most significant contacts" ap-
proach in wrongful death case because of almost 100 years of not applying the Texas
statute to deaths occurring outside state). See also State ex rel. Broglin v. Nangle, No.
58452 (Mo., June 24, 1974).
90. WEINTRAUB, COMmENTARY 207-08; Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict
Problems-Torts, 48 CoRNELL L.Q. 215, 243-44 (1963).
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Weintraub basically follows the Currie approach to conflicts, dividing
the cases into "true" and "spurious" conflicts, that is, cases in which
states' interests clash substantially and those in which the law of only
one state is rationally applicable. 91 He is concerned, however, with
Currie's forum-oriented method of analysis that applies the law of
the forum to resolve a true conflict.92 So Weintraub has proposed four
"tie-breakers" designed to help reach more rational solutions in true
conflict cases. Only the fourth tie-breaker, consideration of the
choice-of-law rules of the contact states, is presently relevant.
No comparison to the "renvoi" concept is intended;98 rather, Wein-
traub proposes that in some situations a court, by construing the non-
forum state's choice-of-law rule, may discover the true nature of that
state's interest. To illustrate, suppose that a husband and wife from
X, a common law property state, are involved in an accident in Y,
a community property state. X allows a wife to sue her husband; Y
does not. Initially, both states appear to have a substantial interest
in the case, X in allowing the wife to recover and Y in either prevent-
ing collusive suits or preventing the husband from profiting by his own
wrong; apparently a true conflict exists. According to Weintraub, how-
ever, the conflict dissolves if the purpose of Y's rule is to prevent the
husband from profiting from his own wrongdoing, because the wife's
recovery for an accident in Y would be community property, but in
a multi-state case Y would not consider the X-wife's recovery com-
munity property and would permit the suit. 4 Thus far, the analysis
appears useful only in determining whether a true conflict exists. But
Weintraub asserts that "[u]sing another state's choice-of-law as a guide
to the purposes underlying that state's domestic law and whether that
state is 'interested' in applying its domestic law to the interstate prob-
lem being decided, may, however, be misleading if that choice-of-law
rule is a rigid, territorial rule, such as place-of-wrong, and is not keyed
to the policies underlying that state's tort rules.' 'Dt In other words,
Weintraub's fourth tie-breaker is useful only if both the forum and
the other jurisdiction engage in interest analysis.
Weintraub's rejection of territorially oriented choice-of-law rules
91. WEIn mAuB, ColMnENTARY 201-02; see CURIE 177.
92. WhnnlRAwB, COMMENTARY 203; see CUIuE 184.
93. See In re Annesley, [1926] Ch. 692.
94. WENTmrAUB, ComMENTARY 208.
95. Id. (footnote omitted).
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as an aid in deciding a true conflicts case is sharply rejected by Profes-
sor Seidelson.9 6 Seidelson, like Weintraub, would not use the foreign
choice-of-law rule as an exclusive means of deciding cases, but simply
as an "enhancer" or "diminisher" of a concerned state's interest.97
Seidelson argues that if a state has retained lex loci delicti for its "pre-
sumed advantages, it has evidenced the degree of its interest in [its
own] domiciliary, like it or not.""8  Thus, in a case like Griggs, the
Missouri court would be correct in concluding that Illinois, if it has
retained lex loci delicti, has expressed disinterest in having its law ap-
plied to a Missouri accident even if two Illinois citizens are involved.
Weintraub probably has the better of this disagreement. If Illinois
had retained (although it has not)99 lex loci delicti as its tort choice-
of-law rule, that retention should not be interpreted as an indication
of the value Illinois places on having its local law applied by other
courts. Instead, Illinois courts, for whatever reason--devotion to
stare decisis,100 fear of the difficulties of interest analysis and the con-
fusion it has caused elsewhere, 01 or love of a perceived certainty and
predictability in the law-would have found the values of lex loci de-
licti to be at least equal to proving Illinois' interest in having its law
applied in those situations in which the outcome will otherwise be det-
rimental to the values and interests of Illinois and its citizens. After
all, the stated purpose of interest analysis is to reach just and rational
results, rather than arbitrary and irrational ones. 102 It is thus hard
to justify the use of what would, by "modem" thinkers, be considered
irrational rules.10 3  There is no need for the forum to impose on the
parties the petrified conflicts analysis of the parties' home state.
Thus, in construing Illinois law the Missouri court erred on two
grounds: (1) by characterizing Illinois as still following a "shrunken!'
rule of lex loci delicti; and (2) by using that characterization to discard
what might otherwise have been a significant Illinois interest-the pro-
tection of its hosts from the ingratitude of their guests.
96. Seidelson, supra note 77.
97. Id. at 292.
98. Id. at 291.
99. See text accompanying notes 81-89 supra.
100. See Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 514, 170 N.W.2d 137, 140 (1969).
101. See notes 10-12 supra.
102. See, e.g., LUFLAP. 265; WEiNTRAuB, COmmmNTARY 203.
103. See Pfau v. Trent Alum. Co., 55 N.J. 511, 520, 263 A.2d 129, 137 (1970).
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2. Missouri Interests
Equally disturbing in Griggs is -the court's implicit recognition of a
strong Missouri interest in providing recovery to the plaintiff.1", The
first consideration in evaluating the court's reasoning is whether Mis-
souri may properly extend an interest in seeing guests recover to sit-
uations in which neither the host nor the guest is a Missouri resident.
As a matter of constitutional law, the state of injury may apply its law
in litigation concerning an injury that occurred within its bound-
aries.'0 5 In a case like Griggs, there are three Missouri interests that
may be forwarded to support application of Missouri law, putting aside
for the moment the problem of the other driver-defendant. First, the
state of injury may have an interest in preventing the victim from be-
coming a public charge, in providing funds for payment of his medical
creditors, and generally in expressing its interest in compensating the
injured. 0 6  But the injured party may be wealthy or may leave the
jurisdiction immediately without incurring medical expenses.' 0" None
of these possible interests is supportable on the stated facts in
Griggs. 1° Secondly, the state of injury may have an interest in regu-
lating the conduct of the defendant-host. 09 As the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire has pointed out, however, it makes little sense to
speak of conduct regulation when the driver endangers himself as well
as his passengers by his misconduct; his self-interest is probably a bet-
104. 489 S.W.2d at 472.
105. See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur.
Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); cf. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
106. Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 576, 249 N.E.2d 394, 399, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519,
524 (1969), apparently overruled on this point by Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d
121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972); Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 162,
203 N.W.2d 408, 414 (1973); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 471, 157 N.W.2d
579, 582 (1968); WEINTRAuB, COMMENTARY 219-20; Currie, The Silver Oar and All
That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U. Cmn. L. REv. 1, 71 (1959); Sedler, Judi-
cial Method is "Alive and Well": The Kentucky Approach to Choice of Law in Inter-
state Automobile Accidents, 61 Ky. L.J. 378, 382 (1973); Trautman, supra note 4.
107. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY 219.
108. The case is silent, but the plaintiff's attorney told me that Griggs incurred $100
in medical expenses in Missouri before he was transferred to a hospital in Illinois. The
attorney said he was certain the bill had been paid before trial. Interview with Mr.
Ray Marglous, in St. Louis, Mo., Mar. 6, 1974. The "general interest" concept is dis-
cussed in text accompanying note 124 infra.
109. See Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 476, 157 N.W.2d 579, 586 (1968);
WEINvmAuB, COMMENTARY 220; Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress?
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ter regulator than potential liability to his guests."10 Finally, the Mis-
souri court might assert an interest in Missouri's capacity as the
forum."' But a guest-host issue involves neither the integrity of the
judicial process nor the ease of application of another state's law; thus
the interest fails. There appears, therefore, no compelling reason why
Missouri in Griggs should extend its concern for guests to non-resi-
dents.
Yet, in a growing number of jurisdictions similar interests have been
held sufficient to control the outcome of the choice-of-law issue. In
Milkovich v. Saari,"2 a recent Minnesota case, the plaintiff-guest and
defendant-host and -owner were all Ontario residents on a one-day
shopping trip to Minnesota. The plaintiff, injured when the car she
occupied went off the road, was hospitalized in Minnesota." 3  Apply-
ing Leflar's five "choice-influencing considerations,"' " 4 the court had
no problem applying Minnesota law after finding that Minnesota had
an interest as a "justice administering state" and, furthermore, that its
law was the "better law."' 5  Similarly, in Summers v. Interstate Trac-
tor & Equipment Co."16 the Ninth Circuit, interpreting Oregon con-
flicts law,' 7 held that the law of Washington, the place of the death
of the plaintiffs intestate, controlled, even though the decedent had
been domiciled in Oregon and the defendant was an Oregon corpo-
ration with its principal place of business there. That Washington was
both the site of a construction project operated by the defendant and
the place of the decedent's death gave Washington "a substantial inter-
est in the application of its law to this case."'" s
110. See Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 32, 216 A.2d 781, 783 (1966); Com-
ment, Most Significant Contacts Method: An Empirical Analysis, 25 V.MD. L. REV.
575, 585 (1972).
111. WEMTRAtB, COMMENTARY 221.
112. 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973), noted in 58 MINN. L. REV. 199
(1973).
113. But all hospital bills had been paid prior to institution of suit. 58 MIN. L.
REv. 199, 201 n.16 (1973).
114. LEFLAR 245; Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U.L. REV. 267, 279 (1966); Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing
Considerations, 54 CAL F. L. REv. 1584, 1586-88 (1966).
115. 295 Minn. at 167, 203 N.W.2d at 417.
116. 466 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1972).
117. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
118. The court was also influenced by the repeal of Oregon's limitation, Ch. 437,
[1961] Ore. Laws 722 (repealed 1967), which was not technically effective as of the
date of death. See text accompanying notes 170-78 infra.
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The problem in concluding that the interests of the state of injury
should control in that state's courts are aptly illustrated in Conklin v.
Homer,"19 a leading case. All parties to a one-car Wisconsin accident
were residents of Illinois and were on a trip that began and was to end
in Illinois. The guests sued their host, who asserted as a defense the
Illinois guest statute, which barred recovery for the simple negligence
of a host. 2 ' The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that a "serious
conflict'' 1 existed between Wisconsin's law permitting full recovery
and Illinois' statute, since Wisconsin wished to see the guests compen-
sated and to deter negligent conduct. 22  To resolve the conflict, the
court turned to the "better law" approach, concluded that Ilinois law
was "anachronistic," and applied Wisconsin law. 23  It is difficult to
criticize this result more forcefully than has Professor Weintraub, an
early advocate of interest analysis:
At the heart of the analysis in Conklin is the court's finding that Wis-
consin had policies that would be significantly defeated if Illinois law
were applied-compensation of the injured, protection of taxpayers and
medical creditors, and deterrence of negligent driving. It is submitted
that Wisconsin had only an officious and hypothetical interest in apply-
ing any of these policies. As for compensation of the injured guest,
Illinois should have been permitted to strike what it considered the
119. 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
120. Law of July 9, 1935, § 42-1, [1935] Ill. Laws 1221 (repealed 1971).
121. 38 Wis. 2d at 477, 157 N.W.2d at 583.
122. Id. at 480, 157 N.W.2d at 585-86.
123. Id. at 483, 157 N.W.2d at 586. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recently
had the opportunity to apply its choice-influencing considerations in a case similar to
Conklin but outside the guest-host or interspousal immunity areas. In Hunker v. Royal
Indem. Co., 57 Wis. 2d 588, 204 N.W.2d 897 (1973), the court was faced with a
conflict between Wisconsin and Ohio law on the issue of whether an employee could
recover, in addition to a workman's compensation award, damages from a fellow serv-
ant in an independent suit. Ohio by statute prohibits an independent suit. Omo REv.
CoDF ANN. § 4123.741 (Page 1954). Wisconsin by judicial decision allows it. Zim-
merman v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 157 N.W.2d 648 (1968). The
plaintiff and his fellow servant, both residents of Ohio, were on a business trip to Wis-
consin when they were involved in a collision with a Wisconsin resident. Contrary
to Conklin, the Hunker court found no substantial interest in applying Wisconsin law
to regulate conduct and, since the plaintiff had received his workman's compensation
award, no overwhelming need to see that the plaintiff was not denied recovery entirely,
as would have been the result in Conklin if Illinois law had applied. On the critical
"better law" consideration, the court was forced to conclude that the trend in the law,
if any, was toward Ohio's handling of the problem, that it was certainly not a "creed
outworn," and that neither law was unmistakedly "better." On this reasoning, the court
held Ohio law applicable.
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proper balance between a desire to compensate the guest and protection
of the host and buyers of liability insurance. It was Illinois, not Wis-
consin, that, in all likelihood, would have to live with the social conse-
quences of striking this balance one way or the other. The desire to
assure compensation to public and private agencies that have rendered
aid to the injured guest is understandable and laudable. Unless these
agencies are Wisconsin agencies that will not be compensated unless
the guest is permitted to recover against the host, however, Wisconsin's
policy of compensation to medical and other creditors of the victim is
either too officious or too hypothetical to compete with the policies un-
derlying the Illinois guest statute. The third Wisconsin "interest," that
of deterring negligent driving in Wisconsin, was well rebutted by the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire when that court wisely decided to
apply the law of the marital domicile, Massachusetts, not the law
of the place of injury, New Hampshire, to prevent a Massachusetts wife
from suing her Massachusetts husband for negligence: "Recognition of
the Massachusetts immunity will not render Massachusetts drivers less
careful on our highways since their own and their wives' safety will still
be jeopardized by carelessness on their part." And, the New Hamp-
shire court might have added, Massachusetts drivers will still be subject
to New Hampshire criminal law for violations of New Hampshire's rules
of the road.124
124. WEINTRAUB, CommENTARY 246 (footnote omitted), quoting Johnson v. John-
son, 107 N.H. 30, 32, 216 A.2d 781, 783 (1966).
Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968), presented the same basic fact pat-
tern as Griggs, with Ohio parties injured in Kentucky, and Ohio (but not Kentucky)
having a guest statute. In commenting on Arnett, Professor Reese observed:
[I]t seems reasonably clear that the Restatement (Second) would call for a
result different from that reached by the Kentucky Court in Arnett ....
Ohio clearly had the greater, if not the only, interest, and under the Restate-
ment (Second), and Section 6 in particular, this would be an important factor
favoring application of Ohio law.
Reese, Kentucky Approach 373-74. Professor Sedler disagrees slightly with both Wein-
traub and Reese, asserting that a case like Griggs is "not necessarily" a false conflict.
He states that:
When two parties from an immunity state are involved in an accident in
a recovery state, their home state likewise has an interest in applying its own
law to immunize its resident defendant and his insurer. But here . .. the
state of injury may also have an interest in applying its law allowing recovery
in favor of a non-resident plaintiff.
Sedler identifies the interests of the state of injury as preventing the plaintiff from be-
coming a public charge, paying off hospital and medical creditors, and effecting the
state's general compensatory policy. Sedler concludes, however, that
any interest on the part of the state of injury in allowing recovery in this sit-
uation is more theoretical than real. In this day and age the injured plaintiff
will get back home, and the only state concerned with his welfare is his home
state. If that state denies recovery in order to protect the defendant and his
Vol. 1974: 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
24 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1974:1
I suggest that Weintraub's criticisms, coupled with those of Reese
and Sedler, 1 5 reveal that conflicts law in the United States has turned
topsy-turvy. For many years, conflicts scholars have attacked the
courts unmercifully for their adherence to lex loci delicti.120  Now that
insurer, the state of injury should defer to that policy.
Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the Unprovided for Case: Reflections on Neumeler V.
Kuehner, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125, 133-34 (1973) (footnotes omitted). See Sedler, su-
pra note 106, at 382-83. Professor Cavers' fifth "principle of preference" provides:
Where the law of a state in which a relationship has its seat has imposed a
standard of conduct or of financial protection on one party to that relation-
ship for the benefit of the other party which was lower than the standards
imposed by the state of injury, the law of the former state should determine
the standard of conduct or financial protection applicable to the case for the
benefit of the party whose liability that state's law would deny or limit.
CAvES 177. Cavers disapproves of this principle, id., which would provide for a result
opposite that of Griggs.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has noted this general criticism; in Hunker v. Royal
Indem. Co., 57 Wis. 2d 588, 204 N.W.2d 897 (1973), the court said in defense of
Conklin:
That [the imposition of tort liability] is a deterrent is one of the accepted
propositions of our law. . . . With the growth of the concept of no-fault and
strict liability, we are, on the other hand, seeing that the deterrent effect of
tort liability may be less valuable as a social tool than its use as a device for
compensating the injured and spreading the risk of loss. While its value as
a guide to a public-policy interest can be overemphasized, it represents an area
of real concern to an affected jurisdiction.
Under modem practice the availability of insurance and the premiums paid
are geared to whether or not the assured has a reasonably good driving rec-
ord. In Wisconsin the failure to satisfy tort judgments triggers procedures
that may cancel driving privileges. . . . Tort liability imposed on parents for
the accidents of their children surely results in some parental admonitions
conducive to safe driving. It is the "accident prone" . . . drivers who are the
exact targets of procedures both by insurance companies and by the state that
seek to deter bad-driving conduct by refusing to insure them and eventually
of depriving them of driving privileges. These procedures are set in motion
by tort judgments. Under reciprocal arrangements, safety-responsibility acts
may be triggered by a tort judgment in another state.
Moreover, we would be blind indeed to the world about us if we are to ig-
nore the barrage of safety-education messages put out by insurance companies.
Seat belt use is stressed . . . . sobriety while driving and courtesy and observ-
ance of the rules of the road are emphasized. Who but the most unsophisti-
cated can believe that insurance company-sponsored educational programs are
not directly related to the impact of tort judgments. It is clear that insurance
company safety programs have had a salutary effect on industrial safety.
Who without a definitive study could assert that the same salutary effect is
not operating to improve our highway safety record.
Id. at 604-05 n.2, 204 N.W.2d at 905-06 n.2.
125. See note 124 supra.
126. See, e.g., W. CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF TmE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1949); CURRiE; Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV.
173 (1933); Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE
L.J. 736 (1924).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss1/6
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many courts have turned to other methods of analysis, with the result
that many Griggs-type cases are decided in favor of forum law that
benefits the plaintiff,' 27 the commentators are beginning to argue that
the new methods of analysis are producing chauvinistic results. 28
There are, however, some encouraging signs that neither lex loci de-
licti nor forum law will be automatically applied. In Neumeier v.
Kuehner129 the New York Court of Appeals approved the following
rule, which should apply to all Griggs-type cases:
When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same
state and the car is there registered, the law of that state should control
and determine the standard of care which the host owes to his guest. 1 0
This rule would not only eliminate decisions that find a "true" conflict
in the mirror image situation and resolve that conflict in favor of liabil-
ity, but would also prevent Griggs-type reasoning, by which a "false"
conflict favoring Illinois law is converted into a "true" one and then
back to "false" by manipulation of the analysis.
The Griggs court asserted an additional interest that makes the
case different from the straightforward applications of forum law pre-
sented above. This additional interest was the protection of the Mis-
souri defendant's right to contribution from Riley if both were found
negligent, since application of Illinois law would "obviate that right.'1 3'
Under Missouri law, if Riley were found liable to Griggs, Martin
might, if he were also found negligent, receive contribution. Thus the
Missouri co-defendant's fiscal security would be protected and Mis-
souri's interest in seeing that joint tortfeasors bear the burden of dam-
ages equally would be furthered. This interest has been uncritically
accepted in other cases.132  In analyzing the interest, an analogy can
127. Summers v. Interstate Tractor & Equip. Co., 466 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1972); Ar-
nett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968); Gagne v. Berry, 112 N.H. 125, 290
A.2d 624 (1972); Bray v. Cox, 39 App. Div. 2d 299, 333 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1972); Kell v.
Henderson, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966); Conklin v. Homer, 38
Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968). Contra, Fuerste v. Bemis, - Iowa -, 156 N.W.
2d 831 (1968); Arbuthnot v. Allbright, 35 App. Div. 2d 315, 316 N.Y.S.2d 391
(1970); Mager v. Mager, 197 N.W.2d 626 (N.D. 1972).
128. See note 124 supra and accompanying text. See also Weintraub, Comments on
Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 556, 559-60 (1968) (decide Griggs-type case in
favor of liability only if medical creditors at place of injury).
129. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
130. Id. at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
131. 489 S.W.2d at 473.
132. Purcell v. Kapelski, 444 F.2d 380, 383 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
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be made to cases in which the presence of insurance is used to bolster
the interests of a jurisdiction or to weaken the insured's arguments
of surprise and unfairness.' 3 3 In these cases, the ubiquitous nature
of insurance becomes a handle courts grasp to find liability and to
avoid analyzing the states' interests in the underlying dispute. A con-
tribution statute should not be used as a pretrial method of assuring
that the statute will come into effect by using it to increase the inter-
ests of the contribution-statute state. Otherwise, the very presence of
the statute will virtually assure the co-defendant who is a resident of
the contribution state of the statute's applicability. The contribution
statute should b used to spread liability among tortfeasors, not to
create it.' 3
4
An additional problem with the Griggs approach to the contribution
interest has been pointed out by Professor Weintraub in his discussion
of the Kentucky conflicts experience. In Arnett v. Thompson 15 an
Ohio driver's wife had, in addition to suing her husband, sued a Mr.
Mullins, a Kentuckian and the driver of the other automobile involved
in the crash. Weintraub initially submits that the Kentucky contribu-
tion statute136 would give Kentucky an additional interest in deciding
whether to apply Ohio immunity law or Kentucky no-immunity law,
940 (1971); Korth v. Mueller, 310 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Clough v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 282 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578,
151 N.W.2d 664 (1967); cf. Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156
N.W.2d 466 (1968) (interspousal immunity).
133. See, e.g., Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 575, 249 N.E.2d 394, 397, 301
N.Y.S.2d 519, 524 (1969); Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290
N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968). But cf. Cavers, The Value of Principled Preferences, 49 ThxAs
L. REv. 211, 220 (1971): "I cling to the notion that a liability insurer is liable only
if and to the extent the insured is liable. A preference disregarding that contractual
relationship does not seem to me to be choosing between competing laws: It is sticking
the insurance company."
134. Contra, cases cited note 132 supra; CAVERS 214 n.11; Weintraub, supra note
76, at 426; Comment, supra note 110, at 590. A distinction may perhaps be made in
this regard between guest-host cases and interspousal immunity cases, at least where the
purpose of the guest statute, as in Illinois, is construed to reflect a policy of preventing
the guest from showing ingratitude by suing his host, see note 39 supra and accompany-
ing text, and the situation presented when the spouse has sued a third person who im-
pleads the other spouse seeking contribution. If the reason for the immunity is to pro-
mote familial harmony or prevent collusive suits, that policy is probably not infringed
by disregarding the immunity. See Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d
98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968); cf. WnnmlnuB, COmmmNTARY 229. In the Griggs situa-
tion the host is not protected at all and the guest statute policy is frustrated.
135. 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968). ,
136. KY. REv. STAT. § 412.030 (1971).https://openscholarship wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss1/6
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but only if Mullins were found liable. 137  In fact, Mullins was exon-
erated by the jury, just as Martin was exonerated by the Griggs jury.138
Weintraub then disputes the conclusion later reached by the Missouri
court that the applicable law "must be determined prior to verdict' 39
by suggesting that Kentucky's (and Missouri's) interests depended on
"whether the driver of the other car is liable to the guest-wife. There-
fore, in such a case, the jury should either be given alternative instruc-
tions concerning the circumstances under which the host-husband can
be found liable, or be instructed to render special verdicts on the var-
ious fact findings that will determine choice of law."'140 This approach
seems eminently sensible. No overwhelming reason appears why the
choice of law must invariably be made before the case is submitted to
the jury. To be sure, the defendant-host may have to await the result
of a full trial, since summary judgment would usually be inappropriate.
As far as the host is concerned, however, if the jury finds his co-de-
fendant not liable and the judge then rules that the immunity law ap-
plies, full trial is certainly preferable to the Griggs result that gives
the forum state an interest not supportable by the facts eventually
found by the jury. The present unavailability in Missouri state courts
of special verdicts (except in limited situations) creates procedural
problems in determining the exact findings of the jury.' 4' Thus alter-
native instructions must be given. This general approach would elimi-
nate the inconsistency of reasoning typified by Purcell v. Kapelski,-42
in which the Third Circuit noted that if the driver of the other car
had "not already been adjudicated free from negligence,"' 143 the state
of his residence would have had an interest in protecting his right to
contribution. As a matter of fact, the interest either exists or it does
not, regardless of the sequence of the determinations.
C. Other Possible Interests
This discussion of Griggs has considered the facts only as of the
137. Weintraub, supra note 76, at 426.
138. 489 S.W.2d at 473-74.
139. Id. at 474.
140. Weintraub, supra note 76, at 426.
141. See Mo. Crv. R. 71.05. This procedure is available in federal court. F.R.
Crv. P. 49(a). See Brown, Federal Special Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator, 44
F.R.D. 338 (1968). This approach is not, however, an approval of submitting the
place of principal conduct to the jury. See Marra v. Bushee, 447 F.2d 1282 (2d Cir.
1971).
142. 444 F.2d 380 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
143. id. at 383.
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time of the accident. The opinion reveals two changes that occurred
after the accident that could have some bearing on the analysis and
outcome. First, the plaintiff subsequently moved to Missouri. 144  Sec-
ondly, Illinois subsequently amended its guest statute to limit its appli-
cation only to hitchhikers. 145  By not considering these changes, the
court impliedly rejected their relevance. Whether that approach was
correct is not an easy question.
1. Plaintiff's Change of Domicile
Since the residence and domicile of the parties is often of great im-
portance in analyzing the interests of the concerned jurisdictions in a
conflicts case, a change in residence or domicile arguably changes
those interests.' 6  Courts, however, have split rather evenly on
whether the change may be taken into account. For example, in
Reich v. Purcell'4 7 the California Supreme Court held that California
acquired no interest in applying its law, which did not limit liability
for wrongful death, 48 on behalf of a plaintiff-beneficiary who moved
to California after the fatal occurrence in Missouri that gave rise to
the claim, even though the defendant was also a Californian. At the
other extreme, the New York Court of Appeals in Miller v. Miller4"'
held that a defendant who moved from Maine to New York after an
accident in Maine in which his New York brother was killed thereby
removed the reason for Maine's protection of him through its wrongful
death limitation, 50 and that the protective interest was therefore not
assertable by the defendant in urging the application of Maine law.''
Both cases have been subjected to vigorous criticism, Reich for not
going far enough' 52 and Miller for going too far. 5 3 Of course, the
144. 489 S.W.2d at 471 n.1.
145. Id. at 472 n.3.
146. In the Introductory Note to chapter 7, "Torts," of the Restatement (Second),
the position is apparently taken that a change in domicile after an accident "should
have no effect upon the law governing most of the issues involving the accident," but
no firm conclusion is stated.
147. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
148. CAL. CrV. PRO. COD § 377 (Dering 1972).
149. 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
150. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2552 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1973).
151. 22 N.Y.2d at 18-19, 237 N.E.2d at 882, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
152. WEINTRAuB, COMMENTARY 249; Gorman, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15
U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 605, 611 (1968); 81 HARV. L. REv. 1342 (1968).
153. Comment, Post Transaction or Occurrence Events in Conflict of Laws, 69
COLUm. L. REv. 843, 860-65 (1969).
[Vol. 1974:1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss1/6
MIRROR IMAGE CONFLICTS CASE
result in Reich (full liability) does not support criticism of the Cali-
fornia court's refusal to consider the plaintiff's move, since the law of
both Ohio,154 the plaintiffs former residence, and California, the de-
fendant's residence, provided unlimited recovery for wrongful death.
The criticism has been directed instead toward the court's position that
changes of residence are never material in conflicts cases. Miller, on
the other hand, has been criticized for taking too lightly the possibility
that the defendant forum-shopped to subject himself to an insured lia-
bility to the plaintiff-sister-in-law. Of course, Miller may also be
criticized for subjecting the defendant to a completely unanticipated
liability.
Although commentators have suggested that no flat rule can be laid
down on whether a post-event move may be taken into account, 155 it
seems clear that only a rare case will present facts supporting a consid-
eration of the move. The factual settings involving a post-event move
may take a variety of patterns. One situation is a move by the plain-
tiff from a state with sufficient contacts to apply its own law to increase
plaintiff's recovery over that of the place of wrong to a state that either
has insufficient contacts to apply its own law or would apply the rule
of lex loci delicti. In such a situation, the Second Circuit in Gore v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc. 56 refused to consider the move and awarded
the plaintiff recovery for the wrongful death of her husband under
the law of New York, the place of her former residence. This result
seems proper, since it could be unfair to reduce the widow's recovery
by her quick move to more congenial surroundings. 51 7 In other situa-
tions involving moves between states each with sufficient nexus to the
case to apply its own law prior to the move,5 8 only four basic fact
patterns will present any analytical problem: (1) plaintiff moves from
plaintiff-protective to defendant-protective jurisdiction; 5 9 (2) plaintiff
154. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19a.
155. See generally Leflar, Torts Provisions 275-76.
156. 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967).
157. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY 250.
158. A move to a state that lacks sufficient nexus with the case prior to the move
probably would not enable that state to apply its own local law as a matter of consti-
tutional law, if that application would substantially affect the outcome of the litigation.
See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936). But cf. Confed-
eration Life Ins. Co. v. deLara, 409 U.S. 953 (1972), denying cert. to 257 So. 2d 42
(Fla. 1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally Comment, Due Process in
Choice-of-Law: The Role of Fundamental Fairness, 9 CALIF. W.L. REv. 136 (1972).
159. Doiron v. Doiron, 109 N.H. 1, 241 A.2d 372 (1968); Kjeldsen v. Ballard, 52
Misc. 2d 952, 277 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1967); Manning v. Hyland,
42 Misc. 2d 915, 249 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1964).
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moves from defendant-protective to plaintiff-protective jurisdiction; 160
(3) defendant moves from plaintiff-protective to defendant-protective
jurisdiction;:"" and (4) defendant moves from defendant-protective to
plaintiff-protective jurisdiction. 1 2 It seems unfair in the second and
third situations to consider a move possibly motivated by desire for
protection, and unfair in the first and fourth to increase or decrease
damages as a result of a move that might otherwise be in the best
interests of the moving party but that could result in surprise by the
change the move makes in liability or in the amount of recoverable
damages. By slight changes in the Reich facts, however, an appealing
case for consideration of the post-event move can be made. 08 Sup-
pose that the plaintiff is the beneficiary widow of a man who was killed
in a Missouri crash with a car driven by a Californian while the plain-
tiff's family was moving from Ohio to California. California retains
its unlimited recovery but Ohio and Missouri have limitations. These
changes would eliminate any suggestion of forum shopping by the
plaintiff and any surprise to the defendant (who is presumably fully
insured in accordance with his possible full liability in California), and
would increase the interest of California in seeing that proper recom-
pense is made to the plaintiff so that the "undesirable social conse-
quences" that may result after the accident will not fall on California.
The Griggs facts, unlike those of the hypothetical, do not support
an analysis that meets the objections to consideration of post-event
moves. First, as far as the opinion reveals, the move could have
been made with the express motive of trying to increase the chances
of recovery under Missouri law.'0 4 The suggestion by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Haines v. Mid-Century Insurance Co."; that "it is
doubtful that anyone would move from one state to another merely
160. Summers v. Interstate Tractor & Equip. Co., 466 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1972);
Griggs v. Riley, 489 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. App. 1972); Haines v. Mid-Century Ins. Co.,
47 Wis. 2d 442, 177 N.W.2d 328 (1970).
161. Doiron v. Doiron, 109 N.H. 1, 241 A.2d 372 (1968).
162. Purcell v. Kapelski, 444 F.2d 380 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940
(1971); Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968);
Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).
163. The hypothetical is taken from WmNTrmAuB, COMMENTARY 251-52.
164. Plaintiff's attorney assured me, however, that the move was motivated solely
by the plaintiff's desire to be closer to his place of business. Interview with Mr. Ray
Marglous, St. Louis, Mo., Mar. 6, 1974.
165. 47 Wis. 2d 442, 177 N.W.2d 328 (1970).
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to take advantage of the latter's allegedly more favorable policies,"' 6
seriously overestimates the scruples of parties involved in substantial
litigation. In the St. Louis area, for example, a move from East St.
Louis, Illinois, to St. Louis, Missouri Oust across the Mississippi River)
could be accomplished at little expense and slight inconvenience. To
suggest that once attorneys and litigants become fully versed in the
intricacies of interest analysis, domicile shopping would not become
a serious and constant problem is simply to ignore realities in a mo-
bile, multi-state trade-center area.' 67
Secondly, the hypothetical assures that the defendant would not suf-
fer the application of a law imposing a higher financial standard of
liability than that of his domicile, thus reducing his argument of sur-
prise or unfair treatment. Although the surprise argument is difficult
to support if the insurer ultimately bears the loss, it will prove difficult
to convince more than a minority of courts that it is not fundamentally
unfair to allow the plaintiff to influence the result in his favor by a
move to a sister state or to subject the defendant (or his insurer) to
increased liability because of a move from a defendant-protective to
a plaintiff-protective jurisdiction. The move by the plaintiff in Griggs
seems to fall squarely within the objectionable nature of a considera-
tion of the move. In fact, the New York Court of Appeals may indi-
rectly have backed away from the zealous interest analysis of Miller,
in which the court discounted this objection to consideration of the
change, when, in Neumeier, the court wrote:
The fact that insurance policies issued in this State on New York-based
vehicles cover liability, regardless of the place of the accident . . . cer-
tainly does not call for the application of internal New York law in
this case. The compulsory insurance requirement is designed -to cover
a car owner's liability, not create it; in other words, the applicable stat-
ute was not intended to impose liability where none would otherwise
exist. This being so, we may not properly look to the New York insur-
ance requirement to dictate a choice-of-law rule which would invariably
impose liability.'6 8
This analysis would apparently lead to a conclusion, contrary to that
of Miller, that the defendant's liability will not be gauged by considera-
166. Id. at 450, 177 N.W.2d at 332.
167. But see CAVERS 66: "I see little evidence that forum-shoppers are exploiting
the existing lack of uniformity and certainty."
168. 31 N.Y.2d at 126, 286 N.E.2d at 456, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 68 (emphasis original).
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tions of surprise to the insurance company. If so, it is difficult to ar-
gue that a change of domicile by the defendant should have the effect
of increasing his liability by perhaps hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Thirdly, as a matter of logical application of interest analysis, Mis-
souri's interests are undoubtedly increased by the plaintiff's move to
Missouri. Plaintiff Griggs may, for example, become a public charge
as a result of the injuries he suffered. It will be interesting to note
whether the New York court with Neumeier has resurrected its state-
ment in Dym v. Gordon169 that it might be well to consider whether
a defendant mulcted in damages could possibly suffer the same fate.
2. The Change in Illinois Law
After the accident that gave rise to the Griggs litigation, the Illi-
nois guest statute was amended to prohibit recovery only by hitchhik-
ers.170  This post-event occurrence is equally as troublesome as the
change in residence. Again, judicial consideration of this change
would have increased the plaintiff's chances of success, since nothing
in the facts suggests -that Griggs was a hitchhiker. It could thus be
argued that Illinois' interest in protecting the defendant-host is not
strong since the legislature has made a recent change in the law.
Courts that have been presented recently with post-event changes in
law have all taken the changes into consideration. In Miller the New
York court said:
Any claim that Maine has a paternalistic interest in protecting its resi-
dents against liability for acts committed while they were in Maine,
should they move to another jurisdiction, is highly speculative and ig-
nores the fact that for the very same acts committed today Maine would
now impose the same liability as New York.171
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit in Summers v. Interstate Tractor & Equip-
ment Co.,'7 2 although it declined to consider the plaintiff's move from
Oregon, which had a limitation on wrongful death at the time of the
accident, concluded:
[I]t is clear that at the date of the accident Oregon had no interest
169. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 124, 209 N.E.2d 792, 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 465 (1965).
170. Law of Sept. 8, 1971, § 1, [1971] Il. Laws 2716, amending ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 95%, § 10-201 (Smith-Hurd 1971).
171. 22 N.Y.2d at 21-22, 237 N.E.2d at 882, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
172. 466 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1972).
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in the application of its law limiting damages. The amendment repeal-
ing that law had passed the legislature and had been signed by the gov-
ernor prior to the accident. Thus, although the limitation was still tech-
nically in effect, the policies and interests supporting the limitation had
been officially rejected and abandoned in favor of the amended legisla-
tion which permits full compensation to the accident victim.173
In a similar manner, the Wisconsin court in Haines used a change in
law to support its conclusion that Wisconsin had the "better law" all
along.'
7 4
It may be argued that consideration of a post-event change in law
gives retroactive application to the new law in violation of the due
process clause,17 but the authorities support retroactive application of
law in conflicts cases when the change does not concern "the parties'
conduct at the time of the liability-creating occurrence."'1 6 Thus, the
Iowa Supreme Court in Berghammer v. Smith' 77 applied a post-event
Minnesota rule on recovery for loss of consortium, in part because the
defendant was an Illinoian and Illinois had imposed liability for such
losses for several years. The defendant could not have been sur-
prised or prejudiced by application of the liability-producing rule.
Again, it is difficult to devise a hard and fast rule on application
of a new law to an occurrence that happened prior to the change.'18
Certainly, consideration of the change would encourage parties to de-
lay the day of trial if a change were being considered by the legisla-
ture. But it is strange for any court to speak of a state's "strong inter-
173. Id. at 49. In State ex rel. Broglin v. Nangle, No. 58452 (Mo., June 24, 1974),
the court said that the removal of Missouri's wrongful death limitation "makes non-
persuasive the railroad's argument that Missouri has some compelling interest to restrict
recovery in the instant matter."
174. Haines v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 2d 442, 451, 177 N.W.2d 328, 333
(1970).
175. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
176. Comment, supra note 153, at 856. See also McNulty, Corporations and the
Intertemporal Conflict of Laws, 55 CAL. L. Rav. 12, 23 (1967):
In determining such an application of the new law, the forum should inquire
into the purpose of the new rules, whether that purpose will be undercut by
exceptions for cases, such as that at hand, and the extent of the forum's inter-
est at the later time in protecting the expectations and investments induced
or reasonably developed earlier.
177. - Iowa -, 185 N.W.2d 226 (1971), noted in 21 DRAKE L. REv. 633 (1972).
178. Many of the cases that have considered the general problem prior to the advent
of modem conflicts analysis are collected at Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 1105 (1964); Annot.,
120 A.L.R. 943 (1939).
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esf' when that interest is embodied in a law that has been repealed
by the legislature or overturned by judicial decision. Be that as it may,
a case like Griggs presents a situation in which the change probably
should not be considered. If it is still proper to speak of surprise to
the defendant, Riley may not have been prepared for the liability that
would be placed upon him retroactively. Perhaps American lawyers
are too ingrained with vested rights theories to react otherwise, but
a majority will undoubtedly recoil from any doctrine that rests the post-
event predictability of recovery or defense on the changing tides of
political fortunes in a state legislature or on a small body of men sitting
as a court.
V. CONCLUSION
The Missouri Court of Appeals reached the wrong result in Griggs
basically because it over-emphasized the hypothetical interest that Mis-
souri has in providing compensation to out-of-state residents and be-
cause it erroneously found an interest in providing contribution to a
Missouri resident who was not found liable for any damages. In so
doing, the court did, however, align itself with a disturbingly large
number of courts that have reached the same result on similar
facts.' 79 The Griggs result displays simultaneously the strength and
weakness of the Restatement (Second) approach to tort choice-of-law
cases. The strength is displayed by the court's conscientious use of
the appropriate general rules and contacts, which it then evaluated in
light of generally agreed-upon principles of choice of law, rather than
merely counting contacts, as was feared by some 180 and as has occa-
sionally occurred."8' The weakness revealed is the inherent overflex-
ibility of the lex loci delicti general approach with its ever-present es-
cape hatch: "unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other
state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in
§ 6 . .. .s1' Thus, even a case like Babcock must be decided under
the exception rather than under a specifically applicable rule. No
wonder then that the results in Griggs-type cases are irreconcilable.
The results in many mirror image cases basically reflect nothing more
179. See cases cited note 127 supra.
180. See, e.g., WmNraAmB, COM2MENTARY 210.
181. See, e.g., Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).
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than a lex fori or "plaintiff wins" approach to choice of law that will
have few defenders, with the result that other courts will be discour-
aged from venturing into modem analysis even in clearly appropriate
cases. 8 ' The time has come for courts caught up in the intractable
problem of the true conflict to recall Currie's early warning that a
court's initial evaluation of its interests sometimes must be reconsid-
ered in a more restrained manner to avoid the true conflict and the
application of forum law.'
183. See, e.g., Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969).
184. CumuE 186: "IThere is room for restraint and enlightenment in the determi-
nation of what state policy is and where state interests lie."
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